It is commonly argued that racial discrimination in the judicial system contributes significantly to the observed discrepancy in incarceration rates for whites and African Americans. This paper uses a series of changes in state laws governing the compilation of lists of eligible jurors to attempt to identify the impact of increasing the share of non-white jurors on the racial composition of admissions to prison. Between 1976 and 1999, 12 states passed laws requiring that lists of eligible jurors for state trials be created by selecting at random from publicly available lists such as lists of registered voters and drivers, limiting the discretion of jury commissioners to select lists that were not representative of the general population and often wholly excluded African Americans from jury service. Evidence exploiting the variation in timing of these law changes suggests that the reforms resulted in a 5 to 6 percentage point drop in the share of new admissions to prison accounted for by non-whites. This finding is consistent with the existence of racial discrimination in the deliberation of criminal cases.
Introduction
African Americans comprised 46 percent of the prison population in the United States in 2000, while only accounting for 12 percent of the total population (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000; United States Census Bureau, 2000) . Part of this disproportionate rate of incarceration reflects differences in crime rates, types of crime committed and arrest rates (Arvanites and Asher, 1998; Tonry, 1995) .
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Americans (Cole, 2000; Kennedy, 1998) . While most observers would likely agree that some form of discrimination on the basis of race occurs in the criminal justice system, little empirical work sheds light on whether discriminatory behavior accounts for a quantitatively significant portion of the observed racial incarceration gap. This analysis takes a step towards assessing the magnitude of the contribution of discrimination to aggregate patterns in incarceration.
Discriminatory actions on the part of a number of actors in the judicial system, including judges, prosecutors, and even defense attorneys, may contribute to this observed disparity in outcomes. I focus on the role of trial jurors 1 . The possibility that juries may make racially biased decisions has attracted considerable attention from both researchers and the popular media, especially in the context of capital trials (Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells, 2004) . Discrimination by jurors would likely have substantial welfare implications for a much broader set of defendants, however -both those who face a jury trial and even some who do not. While only a small percentage of all convictions are obtained through jury trials, the right to trial by jury in criminal cases is constitutionally guaranteed, and the expected outcome before a jury may change the context in which plea bargains are made, affecting defendants whose cases do not ultimately go to trial. The estimates presented in this paper, which focus on a specific set of actors, could arguably be viewed as a lower bound on the total extent to which discrimination contributes to the observed racial incarceration gap.
I use variation in the timing of changes in state laws governing the compilation of lists of eligible jurors to attempt to identify the impact of increasing the share of non-white jurors on outcomes for nonwhites relative to whites in the criminal justice system. Prior to these changes, jury commissioners, town leaders or civilian jury committees could exercise a great deal of discretion in compiling master lists of eligible jurors. 2 In principle, discretionary systems were meant to facilitate the construction of "blue-ribbon juries" comprised of "men of recognized intelligence and probity" (Abramson, 2000) . In practice, these systems also facilitated the near total exclusion of African-Americans and other minorities from jury service in some counties (Kennedy, 1998) . After these changes, master lists were required to be selected at random from publicly available lists such as lists of registered voters and drivers or tax rolls.
In the benchmark specification, I estimate a differences-in-differences specification exploiting variation in timing of the adoption of random selection across states that changed their laws between 1975 and 1999 to test for an effect of changes in the composition of lists of eligible jurors on the nonwhite share of total new admissions to prison. The procedural changes appear to have lowered the nonwhite share of admissions to prison by over 5 percentage points, a finding that is robust to the inclusion of a rich set of controls. An analysis of the dynamic effects of the law changes reveals a time pattern of treatment effects consistent with a causal interpretation -there are no significant differences in the nonwhite share of admissions to prison in the years leading up to the law changes, and a statistically and economically significant reduction immediately following. I also find suggestive evidence that the nonwhite share of admissions to prison dropped more in states with a higher share of nonwhites as a fraction of the total population, although the standard errors are large in some specifications.
Taken together, these findings suggest that increasing the share of nonwhite potential jurors led to a decline in the nonwhite share of admissions to prison, consistent with an own-race bias due to differences in either preferences or information.
There are several challenges in evaluating the impact of these legislative mandates and in assessing whether the estimated effects reflect racial discrimination.
First, there are limited outcome data available over a sufficiently long time series, and those that data that are available are clearly flawed. Due to limited availability of data on conviction rates conditional on going to jury trial by state and race, the analysis focuses on the effect of these laws on the nonwhite share of new admissions to prison. Although this measure includes both admissions resulting from all convictions, rather than just those from jury trials, it arguably may be the most relevant outcome as changes in the expected conviction probability may influence the terms of plea bargains or the seriousness of charges even in cases that do not ultimately go to trial. To the extent that the data contain measurement error that is classical, the flaws in the data collection will result in larger standard errors but not bias the point estimates.
Second, the timing of the law changes may be endogenous in the sense that the passage of these laws may have been driven by improvements in the racial climate that also contemporaneously changed the racial composition of admissions to prison, or they may have been bundled with other civil rights reforms that would affect the nonwhite share of admissions to prison. I try to address this by assessing the sensitivity of results to including more flexible controls for time trends, by examining the timing of the impacts of the law changes, and by testing for changes in racial attitudes in the General Social Survey (GSS) and the American National Election Studies (ANES). I also present some qualitative evidence that these law changes were not high profile political issues, and if anything, were more often bundled with minor procedural reforms in state courts rather than with civil rights-related legislation. There is no evidence that these law changes were coincident with changes in the racial composition of arrests or with changes in racial attitudes in the general population.
One challenge that I am unfortunately not able to address in detail here is to attribute the estimated changes in the demographic composition of admissions to prison to specific shifts in the demographic composition of eligible jurors. To my knowledge, data on jury lists and jury participation across states and over time do not exist, and thus the analysis here is conducted under the maintained assumption that these laws did indeed lead to an increase in the diversity of jury pools in terms of race, gender, and socioeconomic status, as claimed in secondary sources such as Kennedy (1998) . I present suggestive evidence that changes in the racial composition of the jury pool may have been empirically important relative to changes along other dimensions, but this aspect of the analysis is speculative at best.
These findings relate to the empirical literature on discrimination, in particular the literature on discrimination in the criminal justice system. Previous work has found evidence for discrimination in a wide range of contexts, including but not limited to labor markets, marriage markets, and sports. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) find that resumes randomly assigned to have black names receive 50 percent fewer callbacks than those with white names; similarly, Pager and Western (2005) finds that among matched experimental applicants, blacks received substantially fewer job offers, adding experimental evidence to the extensive literature on racial discrimination in the labor market. Price and Wolfers (2007) find NBA referees call more fouls on players of the opposite race, all else equal. In the area of crime and criminal justice, Donohue and Levitt (2001) find that increases in the share of black police officers coincide with increases in white arrests and vice versa, while McCrary (2007) finds evidence for modest effects of the imposition of court-ordered hiring quotas on the racial composition of arrests. In a recent working paper, Abrams, Bertrand, and Mullainathan (2006) find evidence for racial biases in sentencing by judges by exploiting the random assignment of cases to judges. A priori, it seems likely that jurors, who face no career or reputational incentives to act in a non-discriminatory manner, may be more prone to discriminate than judges, prosecutors or law enforcement officers. Iyengar (2007) finds evidence that juries may be more racially biased than judges by examining a Supreme Court decision that shifted the authority to impose sentences from judges to juries in capital cases in 13 states. Finally, a large literature in social psychology finds evidence that similarity between juror and defendant characteristics generally leads to a bias in favor of the defendant. However, these studies largely rely on mock jury experiments, qualitative evidence, or small samples of cases which provide a characterization of cross-sectional patterns Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, and Pryce (2001) .
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief outline of jury selection procedures and describes the law changes examined in this paper. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework for understanding the possible effects of this policy change. Section 4 discusses the data and Section 5 presents the main results. Section 6 concludes and outlines directions for further work.
Background

Jury Selection Procedures
While jury selection procedures vary from state to state, they share several common features across states. The initial pool of eligible jurors is contained in a master list, typically compiled by jury commissioners and district clerks. Names of potential jurors are drawn from this list, and summonses are mailed to those jurors who are drawn. Summoned prospective jurors appear before a judge, and can be excused due to unnecessary hardship. The remaining potential jurors are assigned at random to jury panels for each trial, and are sent to a "voir dire" to be considered for jury service for a particular trial. In most states, jurors may be examined by defense and prosecution attorneys or by a judge. During this process, they may be dismissed "for cause" due to conflicts of interest or preexisting knowledge of the case, or without cause through peremptory challenges 3 . This paper focuses on laws which limited the ability of jury commissioners and district clerks to manipulate the composition of the jury pool by excluding women, African Americans and the poor from the master jury list. Discrimination could occur at each of these stages of jury selectione.g., there is at least anecdotal evidence that peremptory challenges are used to strike black jurors in cases with black defendants, particularly in capital cases (Liptak, 2007) . However, there is some reason to believe that exclusion at stage of compilation of juror lists was significant relative to discrimination at later stages in reducing the representation of nonwhites on juries relative to their population share. A 1972 survey of jury commissioners, district clerks, state attorneys, defense attorneys and judges in 325 counties in the South with large African American populations found that self-reported race shares at different stages (jury list, jury box, jury) indicate that a large fraction of the disparity between population shares and jury service race shares materialized at the stage of the compilation of the jury list Benokraitis (1982) . 4 
Law Changes
A sweeping procedural change occurred in Federal courts as a result of the passage of the 1968 Jury Selection and Service Act, which required the approximately 60% of districts still allowing discretion in the selection of eligible jurors to switch to random sampling from lists of registered voters (Lindquist, 1967) . While a small number of states adopted random selection before 1968, most states slowly switched over following the passage of the federal Jury Selection and Service Act and a 1975 Supreme Court decision which required state courts to do the same (Abramson, 2000) .
As of 1980, sixteen states still retained policies which allowed for discretion in the selection of eligible jurors. As of 2004, only four states allowed for discretion in the summoning of potential jurors (National Center for State Courts, 1980 Courts, , 2004 . Despite the disproportionately low representation of nonwhites on voter rolls, and the opportunities provided by peremptory challenges to strike nonwhite jurors from juries later in the jury selection process, it seems plausible that the number of nonwhite jurors would be higher under random selection than under the key-man system. While there were often prohibitions against discriminatory jury selection in state laws, there is some evidence that these laws were difficult to enforce in the absence of specific statutory requirements limiting discretion in procedures such as the compilation of lists of eligible jurors. One legal scholar found that between 1935 and 1975, the Supreme Court heard on average one case per term regarding discriminatory jury selection procedures, and usually ruled in favor of the defendant (Van Dyke, 1977) . The persistence of such cases into the 1970's shows that discriminatory practices continued even though there was a clear precedent that they would be ruled unconstitutional (Abramson, 2000) .
Even laws mandating the use of specific source lists alone, without supplementary legislative mandates specifying that potential jurors should be selected at random from them, appear to have left substantial room for discretion in the compilation of lists of eligible jurors 5 . In the coding of state laws, I follow the taxonomy in the Bureau of Justice Statistics' "State Court Organization" publications and focus on two aspects of the laws governing compilation of the master list: whether they specify a source list (such as the voter registration list or list of registered drivers), and whether they require random selection from these lists rather than giving a substantial amount of discretion to jury commissioners, clerks, or jury commissions comprised of citizens or civil servants. States are coded as having adopted "random selection" if the laws specify source lists and require random selection from those lists. African Americans in the county at the time, only 25 were eligible to serve on juries. Even more shockingly, no African American had served on a jury in that county in the previous 30 years (Patton v. Mississippi, 332 US 463) (Abramson, 2000) . In another example, in 1975 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the disparity between the 51 % population share of Quitman County and the 24 % share on the list for trial juries, when added to evidence showing that this disparity appeared only after the stage of the process where discretion could be exercised, provided prima facie evidence of discrimination (Foster v. Sparks, 1975) .
Discussion of the procedures governing compilation of jury lists appears infrequently in the academic literature on discrimination, although they are featured prominently in more recent histories of discrimination and the criminal jury (Kennedy, 1998; Alschuler and Deiss, 1994) . It also does not appear that these law changes were contemporaneous with the passage of broader state-level civil rights legislation, although they were in some cases bundled with procedural reforms such as the institution of one day-one trial systems of jury service. In addition, these law changes do not appear to have generated attention in the popular media at the time they were enacted, suggesting that they were not politically salient issues and leaving open the possibility that they do not simply reflect general improvements in race relations that would independently drive changes in the racial composition of crime and admissions to prison.
In addition to this qualitative evidence, below I present some tests of the endogeneity of these law changes to improvements in racial attitudes in the general public or in law enforcement, as well as placebo tests using data from Federal courts. While it is still possible that both the passage of these laws and the corresponding changes in the racial composition of admissions to prison were jointly driven by unobserved factors, these tests provide some confidence that the most obvious of these mechanisms may not be at play.
Theoretical Framework
The effect of random sampling on the nonwhite share of admissions to prison is theoretically ambiguous. However, the most intuitive prediction would be that increasing the representation of nonwhites on jury panels would lower conviction rates for nonwhites relative to whites and thus would lower the nonwhite share of admissions to prison through two channels: through a direct impact on conviction probabilities conditional on reaching trial, and through the effect this change in conviction probability may have on the treatment of cases at earlier stages in the process.
Given that a small share of cases actually go to trial, it would perhaps be surprising to observe a quantitatively significant effect of changes in jury selection procedures on rates of admission to prison without considering the indirect effect that changes in these procedures may have at earlier stages, for example by changing the threat points for negotiations between defense attorneys and prosecutors over the terms of plea bargains.
To illustrate these two effects, consider a toy model in which the prosecutor's objective is to maximize expected punishment possible given three possible outcomes: acquittal, which involves a punishment of 0; plea bargain punishment L (which is for now assumed to be exogenously given, and assumed to be a punishment other than inprisonment); and conviction (resulting in imprisonment)
H . Let p be the probability that the jury will convict, and C be the cost to the prosecutor of taking the case to trial with probability distribution F (). The prosecutor will then take a case to trial if p · H − L > c, or with probability F (p · H − L), and the defendant will be sent to prison with probability p · F (p · H − L). The effect of an exogenous shock to p is given by: dP r(imprisoned) dp
Both terms are positive, so a negative shock to p will unambiguously reduce the share of defendants who are imprisoned. The first term captures the direct effect of a change in p on the probability of imprisonment. The second term captures the indirect effect: prosecutors may be more willing to agree to plea bargains if the probability of conviction goes down. This is a crude toy model, and in reality prosecutors could adjust on a number of margins, including the severity of the charge and sentencing, but it captures the basic intuition behind why changes in jury composition may have substantial effects on imprisonment even though a small share of cases go to trial.
The discussion to this point has taken for granted that random sampling would decrease the probability of conviction for nonwhites, but it is plausible that the effect of moving to random sampling could increase conviction probabilities for nonwhites.
First, some argue that all-white juries convict insufficiently frequently or impose less stringent sentences in cases involving African American defendants and African American victims (Kalven, 1971) . Consistent with this hypothesis, Blume, Eisenberg, and Wells (2004) finds that black defendants convicted of murdering black victims are underrepresented on death row given the share of black defendant-black victim murder cases among all murder cases, and that this shortfall is larger in the South than in the rest of the country. Given that both violent and nonviolent crimes are most often intraracial, introducing more nonwhites into the pool of eligible jurors could then in theory raise the rate of nonwhite admissions to prison.
Second, random sampling could have brought less educated whites as well as more nonwhites into the pool of eligible jurors. These less educated whites could be more biased jurors than the "men of probity" who supposedly served as jurors under the key-man system. Third, to the extent that these changes were mitigated by the use of peremptory challenges to remove nonwhite jurors from jury panels, these results suggest that the inclusion of a small number of nonwhite jurors on a jury panel may heavily influence trial outcomes. This may reflect the fact that jury verdicts in most jurisdictions must be unanimous, so the dissent of a single juror would be sufficient to prevent conviction. Finally, given that only a small share of criminal cases go to jury trials, it may be the case that changes to the pool of jurors would have no effect or a very small effect on admissions to prison, if the effect of a change in the expected conviction rate on upstream decisions such as plea bargaining is small.
Data
The timing of the de jure changes were obtained from each state's annotated state code. The year in which each state changed its policy (to the best of my knowledge), as well as a list of states that never changed their policies appear are summarized in Table 1 and documented in more detail in Appendix A. The date of the law change was inferred from four cross sections from secondary sources that document the laws governing source list compilation in 1977, 1980, 1983, 1998 and 2004 ; from notes to the relevant codes in current and superseded versions of the annotated state code for each state; and from state-specific secondary sources in some cases. States which , 1926-1986" for 1975-1985 .
The National Corrections Reporting Program datasets contain individual level information on admissions to prison, including a limited set of demographic characteristics (age, sex, race, and education), the most serious charge, the maximum time to be served, whether the individual is being newly committed to prison, and the county in which the sentence was imposed. For this analysis, I aggregate these data up to state-year cells. Since race for nonwhites was only coded as "nonwhite" or "other" in some years, I code all admissions data in that fashion, rather than focusing on African American admissions to prison.
The NCRP data begin in 1983, and data quality is especially poor for the first few years. Thus, Although the best available, both series are seriously flawed, with missing observations for many state-year pairs and obviously incorrect data (potentially due to nonreporting) in others.
The analysis excludes data from Alaska, Hawaii, Connecticut and Louisiana due to very poor data quality 6 . State-year pairs with fewer than 100 new admissions to prison were dropped from the analysis as well. Even after dropping these obviously flawed state-year observations, there is a large amount of year to year variation in the numbers of admissions to prison that does not appear to reflect real variation. This analysis thus focuses on the nonwhite share of admissions to prison rather than the absolute numbers of prisoners admitted or number of prisoners admitted per population.
Given the questionable data quality, the findings in this paper should be interpreted with some caution (although if the measurement error in the outcome variable is classical, this should result in larger standard errors but not bias the estimates). Summary statistics for the data used in this analysis appear in Table 2 .
Data from the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) on arrests by race were obtained for 1980-1999 through the National Consortium on Violence Research.
The uneven coverage across states and over time reduces the number of law changes that can be used to identify the treatment effect from 12 to 7 in the specification without controls, and to only two states in the specification with the most comprehensive set of controls.
Results
Estimates using the variation in timing of laws mandating random selection suggest that the institution of statutory requirements that lists of eligible jurors be selected at random led to a 5 to 6 percentage point drop in the nonwhite share of admissions. Pooling the data, a weighted least squares estimate of the difference-in-differences specification shows that rates of admission to prison for non-whites were lower in years following the passage of such laws, and that this finding is robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a rich set of controls (Table III , columns I through IV, includes state and year fixed effects) 7 . I estimate the following specification for the nonwhite share of admissions to prison:
where the standard set of controls include an indicator that is equal to 1 if the outcome data are not from the NCRP, the nonwhite population share, the log of the state population in thousands, the log of the number of prisons per capita lagged one year, whether or not the state has a nondiscretionary concealed handgun law, the log of state income per capita in $2000, the log of police per capita lagged one year, the unemployment rate, beer consumption in gallons per capita, the poverty rate, AFDC generosity lagged 15 years, and the nonwhite share of arrests.
For the benchmark specification including state and year effects the full set of controls (column IV of Table 3 ), this finding is robust to controlling for time trends more flexibly by adding linear state-specific trends or region-year fixed effects (Appendix Table D ). This provides confidence that the estimated treatment effect does not reflect differences in trends in adopting and nonadopting states, any differences in unobserved factors that trend linearly over time with states, or regionspecific time varying unobserved factors. The estimate is stable across specifications. The estimate is also robust to weighting by state population and qualitatively robust to being estimated with OLS (Appendix Table E ).
One unusual feature of the set of law changes I am able to analyze with these data is that a large number of states were treated shortly before the beginning of the dataset. If the treatment effect increases over time -for example, because imprisonment may increase the returns to future criminal activity or decrease the returns to licit economic activity -then β, the decrease relative to the average trend for the largely already treated "control" states, will underestimate the true treatment effect.
Further evidence that this estimate can be interpreted as causal is provided by examining the timing of the effect. I estimate coefficients on leads and lags of the policy change to trace out the effect of the change over time:
where P reRandomSelection k it is a dummy that takes on a value of 1 for observations that are k years preceding the passage of a random selection law, and P ostRandomSelection k it takes on a value of 1 for observations that are k years following the passage of a random selection law. Figure 1 shows that there is no difference in the years leading up to the law change, but a significant decline in the nonwhite share of new admissions in the years immediately following the law change. I cannot reject the hypothesis that the leads of the law changes are jointly equal to zero (p-value = 0.32), but can reject the hypothesis that each of the lags is individually equal to zero at the 10 percent level, and the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to 0 at the 1 percent level (p-value = 0.002).
The move to random selection likely resulted in more diverse jury pools on a number of dimensions including but not limited to race, such as gender, education and income. In order to test whether the observed treatment effect can be attributed to changes in the racial composition of juries rather than to these other changes, I estimate a differences-in-differences-in-differences specification which exploits the fact that the effect of the policy change should have been greater in states with a higher share of non-whites. Suppose that in every state, prior to random sampling, a very small number of non-whites would have served on juries. Random sampling would have produced a greater change in the composition of juries in those states in which African Americans comprise a larger share of the population.
The differences-in-differences-in-differences specification takes the form:
(Table V, columns I through IV) and
where in the second set of specifications, the controls include the square of the nonwhite population share (Table V , columns V through VIII).
γ and µ are the coefficients of interest. Table V shows that states with larger non-white populations experienced larger declines of non-white admission rates to prison relative to whites than those with smaller non-white populations as a result of the switch from the keyman system to random selection, although γ is only statistically significantly different from 0 in the specifications including the quadratic term. The magnitudes suggest that the effects were substantially larger in states with larger nonwhite population shares. The negative coefficient on the quadratic suggests a declining marginal impact in the nonwhite population share. These features should be interpreted with some caution, because of the small number of law changes involved.
This additional interaction clarifies the interpretation of the difference-in-difference results. It is clear that if nonwhite jurors were prone to convict nonwhites at a higher rate than whites in order to better enforce the law in their communities, then states with larger shares of nonwhites should have experienced increases or smaller drops in admissions to prison. In light of this result, we can rule out that story in favor of one in which juries with more whites result in higher rates of admissions to prison for nonwhites -these results can be interpreted as evidence for some type of discrimination by race.
To shed light on the relative importance of the direct effect on conviction probabilities and the indirect effect through the induced changes at stages preceding trial, I test separately for an effect of the law changes on rates of admissions for nonviolent and violent crime (Table VI) . Individuals are classified as having been admitted for a nonviolent or violent crime on the basis of the most serious charge for which they were admitted.
The total decline in the nonwhite share of admissions should reflect both the direct effect of the change in procedure on the conviction probability conditional on going to trial, and the indirect effect induced by this on plea bargaining and other aspects of case processing at earlier stages of the process. A larger share of violent crime cases go to jury trial, so assuming a common effect of changing racial composition on conviction probability for the two categories of crimes, the treatment effect should be larger for violent than nonviolent crimes if the direct effect dominates. However, admissions to prison for nonviolent offenses may be more elastic to changes in conviction probabilities if alternative punishments such as parole are viewed by prosecutors as better substitutes for imprisonment in cases involving nonviolent offenses than for those involving violent offenses. The estimated effect is larger and more statistically significant for nonviolent offenses, suggesting that a substantial portion of the reduction in the nonwhite share of admissions to prison may reflect the strategic response of prosecutors following a decline in the conviction probability.
Although I do not directly observe plea bargaining here, Kuziemko (2006) finds evidence for an analogous effect on plea bargaining following the 1998 reinstitution of capital punishment in New York state using case-level data. She finds evidence that the ability to pursue a death sentence led to a 3 percentage point jump in the probability that a murder defendant would plead guilty, a 26 percent increase relative to baseline, as well as a 4 percentage point drop in the probability that a murder defendant would be offered a charge bargain. These are large effects given that death notices were issued in fewer than 8 percent of first degree murder cases. Her work suggests that changes in the expected severity of punishment can substantially affect plea bargaining; it seems reasonable to believe that changes in the expected probability of conviction in a jury trial would do the same.
While these estimates are an improvement over the existing literature, this analysis is subject to the usual critiques of panel data analyses that exploit variation in states' policies. The most difficult critique to address is that the timing of the states' policy changes may be endogenous to the outcome of interest. If the factors that determine states' policies are additive and constant over time, then including state fixed effects removes the endogeneity problem. The addition of more flexible controls for time trends can absorb any unobserved differences that may create differential trends in states that change their policies relative to those who do not. However, if the unobserved factors change contemporaneously with the laws -if for example, the law changes were caused by improvements in attitudes towards nonwhites, or if states changed their policies anticipating a future decrease in the probability of guilt conditional on arrest for non-whites relative to whitesthen the panel estimates will be biased (Besley and Case, 2000) .
I test whether there were contemporaneous improvements in attitudes towards nonwhites using data from the American National Election Studies. The ANES surveys have been administered nationally every two years since 1948, and in addition to questions about voter participation and politics, includes questions on issues such as race. The set of questions varies over time. Between 1976 and 1994, the ANES asked whether respondents thought that the government should enforce school integration. Between 1986 and 1998, the ANES asked respondents whether they were for affirmative action in hiring and promotion, whether they thought that blacks "had gotten less than they deserved", and whether they thought that blacks should get no special favors. These questions do not capture the aspects of attitudes towards nonwhites that would be most relevant for their treatment in court, especially those that focus on the role of government in ameliorating racial differences, but they are likely to be capture some information about prevailing attitudes about race relations 8 .
Using a difference-in-difference specification including state and year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered at the state level, I test whether these measures of racial attitudes changed discontinuously at the time of the passage of laws mandating random selection:
where here i indexes the individual in state j and survey year t, and the controls include race, gender, dummies for five income categories, age, and age squared. There is no evidence that these indicators moved in a direction favorable to nonwhites at the time of the law changes, and some evidence that they deteriorated relative to the rest of the country at those times (Table VII. A).
These results should be regarded as only suggestive, since the ANES sample sizes in any given year are small and the survey is not designed to be representative at the state level.
Using the same specification, I test for contemporaneous changes in attitudes in a number of indicators of racial attitudes from the GSS (Table VII.B) . These also provide no evidence that racial attitudes could drive both the observed changes in the racial composition of admissions to prison and the law changes.
In addition, I perform a similar analysis using the nonwhite arrest share as the outcome variable and find no evidence for an effect of random selection laws on the nonwhite arrest share (Table   IX) . To the extent that the nonwhite arrest share may be correlated with attitudes among police officers towards nonwhites or changes in the racial composition of the police force, this suggests that the estimated effect was not driven by changes in attitudes towards nonwhites at other points in the justice system.
As an additional rough check for the endogeneity of changes in state laws, I generate an indicator for "early adopter" that is equal to 1 if the state changed its policy by 1975. I then regress (linear probability model) this on various 1975 state characteristics, including income per capita, the share of the state population that is nonwhite, arrests per 1000 population, police per 1000 population, total population, and AFDC generosity. These are shown in Table X .
Conclusion and Interpretation
I find that randomly selecting eligible jurors from publicly available lists resulted in fewer nonwhite admissions to prison in states, and some evidence that this was more pronounced in states with more nonwhites as a share of their populations. This result is consistent with a story in which juries with fewer nonwhites are more rather than less likely to convict nonwhite defendants.
This result is suggestive but not conclusive, and could be improved upon in several ways. In further work, I plan to use micro data on jury panels to test specifically for the influence of the demographic characteristics of jurors on trial outcomes.
More broadly, a limitation of the results is that they cannot distinguish between taste-based discrimination and statistical discrimination. These two theories of discrimination would have different welfare implications and may suggest differing policies. Nor can they distinguish between various models of statistical discrimination.
It is straightforward to show that discriminatory preferences could produce an elasticity of non-white convictions with respect to the composition of the pool of eligible jurors. In this case, an intervention to achieve the socially optimal incarceration rate by providing for more or less representation of nonwhites on juries may be warranted (such as the abolition of peremptory challenges, which in many states either defense or prosecution lawyers can use to dismiss jurors without cause). The socially optimal conviction rate could be a function of parameters that differ across racial groups, such as the elasticity of crime with respect to deterrents, or the probability of guilt conditional on arrest. In this case it is unclear from observing an elasticity whether the share of nonwhite jurors should be increased or decreased.
However, in spite of these limitations, the empirical evidence presented in this paper can speak to two broad areas of policy debate. First, they demonstrate that discrimination may contribute in a quantitatively significant way to the observed aggregate differences in incarceration rates for blacks and whites. While much previous research has focused on the role of race in capital cases, these account for an very small share of the total case load and observations made about capital crimes may not generalize to cases involving less serious crimes if high profile or highly emotionally charged cases involving murders inspire more biased decisionmaking than would occur in lower profile cases, or if race is seen as more salient in these types of cases than in those involving less serious offenses. Second, this analysis suggests that policies that allow for discretion at various stages of case processing may have important distributional implications or "disparate impact".
These should be taken into account as well as overall social welfare considerations when considering whether policies allowing for discretion should be implemented 9 . Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by total admissions to prison in each state-year cell. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by total admissions to prison in each state-year cell. 
Georgia
No change §15-12-40
Selection:
Discretion, exercised by a 6-member jury commission appointed by a judge.
Source list:
List of registered voters, tax digest, and personal acquaintances.
Selection:
Discretion, exercised by a 6-member jury commission appointed by a judge. No particular source.
Discretion, exercised by a 5-member citizen jury commission appointed by a judge or the governor.
Source lists:
No particular source.
Selection:
Discretion, exercised by a 5-member citizen jury commission.
Source lists:
No particular source. Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at state level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Observations are weighted by total admissions to prison in each state-year cell.
